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Abstract
A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have
occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been
created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple
actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed
additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants
were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical
actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants’ beliefs in fake
actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false
memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be
experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event’s occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory
for an event can be independently-occurring constructs.
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Introduction
Counter-intuitive as it might sound, people do not always
believe that the events they remember really occurred. Many
people report having a memory that they know to be false [1], and
in some cases these memories can concern extremely significant
experiences. For instance, there are documented cases of people
with memories of severe childhood abuse having encountered
incontestable proof that the events they recall could not possibly
have happened [2]. Here we report on an attempt to
experimentally create nonbelieved memories in the lab by systemat-
ically stripping people’s memories of their underlying beliefs.
Theoretical accounts of autobiographical memory and con-
structive memory processes have increasingly focused on believing
as a foundation and precursor to remembering [3–5]. Scoboria,
Mazzoni, Kirsch, and Relyea [6], for example, proposed a nested
structure for autobiographical reasoning, whereby if an event is
remembered then it will also be believed to have occurred, and if it
is believed to have occurred, it will also be seen as plausible.
Conversely, an event can be judged as plausible in the absence of
belief, and can be believed to have occurred in the absence of a
memory. This study [6] offered empirical support for this nested
model: specifically, their participants gave ratings of plausibility,
belief and memory for ten specific events that they might have
experienced in childhood. The results showed that ratings were
almost always higher for plausibility than for belief, which in turn
was rated higher than memory. Indeed, participants gave belief
ratings that were equal to or greater than their memory ratings on
95.7% of occasions.
It seems clear that the nested model provides a good account of
the relationship between belief and memory. But what about the
remaining 4.3% of occasions in Scoboria et al.’s study in which
participants gave memory ratings that were higher than their belief
ratings? Is this small percentage attributable merely to random
error? It would appear not. In fact, there is both anecdotal and
empirical evidence that nonbelieved memories do occur.
Perhaps the best-known anecdotal report of a nonbelieved
memory was reported by Piaget [7], who vividly recalled being the
victim of an attempted kidnapping in infancy. Thirteen years after
this purported crime, Piaget learned that the whole event was a
fiction fabricated by his nanny; yet Piaget maintained that he could
still ‘remember’ it occurring. To explore incidences like Piaget’s,
Mazzoni et al. [1] recently reported the first empirical study of
nonbelieved memories. The authors asked 1,593 undergraduates
whether they could remember an event that they did not believe
happened. Nearly a quarter of the sample reported having a
memory of this type, thus establishing the status of nonbelieved
memories as more than exceptional anecdotal oddities.
Mazzoni et al. [1] asked their participants about the character-
istics of their nonbelieved memories, and found that these memories
in fact had many phenomenological similarities with ‘regular’
believed memories. For example, both types of memory were rated
similarly in terms of visual characteristics, emotional richness, and the
feeling of ‘reliving’ and mental time-travel. Contrastingly, nonbe-
lieved memories differed from believed memories on several other
characteristics such as auditory quality and the sense of significance.
These results led the authors to conclude that nonbelieved memories
are experienced as genuine memories in many respects.
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Mazzoni et al.’s [1] data are intriguing and informative, but to
understand nonbelieved memories better, and thus to gain a
stronger insight into the role of beliefs in memory construction, it
would be beneficial to be able to create these memories
experimentally. To consider how we might create nonbelieved
memories, one should consider why people stop believing in their
memories. Respondents gave numerous reasons, but the most
common was that someone else informed them that the event did
not occur [1]. Similarly, in studies of co-witness influences upon
memory, participants who remember particular details are often
far less likely to privately report those memories after they receive
feedback from a confederate denying the presence of those details
[8]. An analogous process to this occurs after the experimental
phases of false-memory research, when the experimenter debriefs
participants at the end of the study. Debriefing after a suggestive
procedure might thus be one method for experimentally creating
and exploring nonbelieved memories, and was thus the focus of
the present study.
Testing the effects of debriefing on beliefs and memories is
important for two reasons. First, as we have outlined, debriefing
could provide a way to create and thus to systematically investigate
nonbelieved memories. Second, and more broadly, it raises the
practical question of whether participants in false-memory
experiments tend to leave those studies with the effects of the
induction fully reversed by the experimenter’s debriefing. In other
words, does debriefing successfully ‘undo’ participants’ false
memories, or does it simply ‘undo’ their beliefs, leaving
nonbelieved memories intact?
In the present study we used Nash and colleagues’ doctored-
video procedure to induce false memories in participants [9,10]:
participants saw doctored video clips that purported to ‘prove’
they had performed actions that they did not truly perform. A few
hours later they were fully debriefed, after which we re-assessed
their beliefs and memories to see whether their false memories
were ‘still there’. At this point we also assessed the characteristics of
participants’ beliefs and memories. Using this doctored-video
procedure has at least two benefits for our purposes: First, the
procedure has been shown to induce high rates of strongly-held
false beliefs and memories, as compared to other false-memory
paradigms such as the imagination inflation procedure that tend to
induce significant but small confidence increases [11,12]. Second,
in Nash et al.’s studies, many participants made informal remarks
after debriefing that they could ‘still remember’ performing the
false actions that were suggested. This observation gives credence
to the hypothesis that debriefing after the doctored-video
induction could leave nonbelieved memories behind.
The results of the study confirm the prediction that the
debriefing in a false memory study leaves behind memory-like
experiences for recent events. These are probably mental images
that to a large extent feel like genuine memories, even though the
belief in those mental images is substantially reduced by the
debriefing. It also revealed that Nash et al.’s paradigm produces a
smaller number of non-believed memories before the debriefing,
thus creating clear memories for actions that participants are not
very certain to have performed. These data confirm that memories
and beliefs are independently-occurring constructs and as such can
be manipulated independently.
Materials and Methods
Ethical approval
This research has been approved by the Ethics Committee at
the Department of Psychology, University of Hull, UK.
Participants and Design
Twenty participants (18 females, 2 males) completed all sessions
of the study; their ages ranged from 18–54, (M=24.15, SD=9.13).
Participants who studied psychology were compensated with
course credits; non-psychology students participated voluntarily
without compensation. The study had a within-subjects design,
with critical action type (performed, fake, new) and session (Session
2 pre-debriefing, Session 3 post-debriefing) as the manipulated
variables.
Materials and procedure
We selected 42 of the simple actions from [10] for use in the
various stages of this study. From these, we selected six actions to
be critical actions (clap your hands, click your fingers, rub the table, salute,
cover your face with your hands, and flex your arm). The critical actions
were selected on the basis that they were neither highly
memorable nor unmemorable, based on the ratings collected in
the Nash et al. study. These six actions were randomly divided into
three pairs that were assigned—counterbalanced across partici-
pants—as the performed, fake and new critical actions. Performed
critical actions were genuinely performed by participants in
Session 1; fake actions were not performed, but doctored evidence
presented in Session 2 suggested that they were indeed performed;
new critical actions were neither performed nor suggested, but
appeared only in the belief and memory questionnaires in Sessions
2 and 3, and were used as a control.
Session 1. The procedure used here was modelled after Nash
et al.’s [9,10] procedure. Participants were greeted by a researcher,
and informed that the study was investigating people’s ability to
mimic others’ actions. They were told that their task would involve
observing the researcher performing a series of actions, and then
copying the actions themselves. They were also informed that they
would be video-recorded as they completed this task. After gaining
consent, the researcher and participant sat at a table facing each
other, and with the video-camera directed toward them both. The
researcher started filming the session, and began by performing a
simple action for 12 sec. After this period, the participant was then
required to copy the action they had seen for a further 12 sec.
Next the researcher performed a second action, and this
‘observe—copy’ process continued until both the researcher and
the participant had performed 26 actions, including the 2 critical
actions that had been assigned as ‘performed actions’. The 24 non-
critical actions were performed in a single randomized order in all
participants’ sessions, as these were essentially fillers. The critical
performed actions were always performed in the 9th and 17th
position of the sequence.
After completing all 26 actions, the participant was thanked and
reminded to return for Session 2. Once the participant had left the
room, the researcher returned to the table and filmed himself
performing the two critical actions that had been assigned as fake
actions. The researcher performed each of these for 12 sec while
seated in the same position as he had sat while the participant was
present.
Preparing the video-sequences. Following Session 1, we
used Adobe After Effects software to doctor two clips from the
video-recording. As in Nash et al. [9,10], and as depicted in
Figure 1, each doctored clip was created by digitally combining
two genuine clips: one that showed the researcher performing a
critical action after the participant had left the room, and one that
showed the participant passively observing a different action. The
images from these clips were combined to produce composites that
seemed to prove that the participant had in fact observed the two
fake actions. Because participants also performed all of the actions
they observed, these clips were therefore designed to persuade
Non-Believed Memories for Recent Events
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participants that they had also performed these two actions. Next,
we used Adobe Premier Pro to embed these doctored clips into a
longer sequence of clips taken from the genuine recording. The
full sequence comprised clips of the two fake actions, the two
performed critical actions, and eight other non-critical performed
actions as fillers; all participants saw the same eight filler actions.
All 12 clips were 10-sec in length, and separated by 5-sec pauses
during which the screen was blank; thus the full video-sequence
lasted just under 3 min. We did not want the critical actions to be
highly salient in the video-sequence; the performed critical actions
were thus placed in positions 3 and 7 and fake actions in positions
5 and 10 of the video sequence.
Session 2. Participants returned for Session 2 two days after
Session 1. In this session participants were shown their 3-min
video-sequence twice through. To ensure participants paid
attention to the actions in the video, on the first viewing they
were asked to note down how many times they thought they
performed each action in a week. On the second viewing,
participants were asked to name each action. Participants next
completed a 5-min filler task (solving anagrams), after which they
completed two questionnaires that asked whether they believed and
remembered that they performed various specific actions during
Session 1. Participants completed the memory questionnaire first:
this questionnaire listed 28 actions including 22 non-critical fillers
(of which 10 were performed in Session 1 and 12 were new) and
the 6 critical actions. For each action, participants used an 8-point
scale to rate their memory, in response to the question ‘‘How
strongly do you remember performing this action in Session 1?’’.
Following the memory questionnaire, participants completed the
belief questionnaire, which comprised the same 28 actions in a
different order. Here, participants again used an 8-point scale to
answer the question ‘‘How strongly do you believe you performed
this action in Session 1?’’. In both questionnaires, a rating of ‘8’
signified a strong belief or memory. Our initial piloting showed
that participants understood the distinction between belief and
memory better when the memory questionnaire was administered
first, and so we did not counterbalance this ordering. Doing so
might have negated a possible confound insofar as people’s belief
ratings might have been influenced by their memory ratings;
however, for the purpose of this exploratory study, we decided it
preferable that participants were fully able to understand the
conceptual difference. After completing these questionnaires,
participants were again thanked and reminded to return for
Session 3.
Session 3. Participants returned for Session 3 approximately
4 hours after Session 2. In this session, we explained to
participants that some of the video-clips they saw in Session 2
had been doctored, and we told them which clips were the fakes.
For each of the six critical actions, participants were then asked to
provide new belief and memory ratings using the same scales as in
Session 2. Finally, participants completed a questionnaire probing
the phenomenological characteristics of their memories. For each
of the six critical actions, they were asked to rate 25 memory
characteristics on 7-point scales (see Materials S1).
Results
In the following section we present our findings in four stages.
First we examine the data measuring participants’ beliefs and
memories for critical actions in Session 2, and we look for evidence
of nonbelieved memories among these reports. Second, we
conduct the same analyses on the comparable data from Session
3. Third, we look at the changes in participants’ ratings between
Session 2 and Session 3. Fourth, we analyze the phenomenology
data collected in Session 3. Although we also analysed the data
with two repeated measures factorial ANOVAs including Session
(Session 2 vs. Session 3) as a within-subjects variable, for ease of
interpretation we report the outcomes of separate analyses of
Session 2 data, Session 3 data, and change-scores. The results of
the overall ANOVAs were wholly consistent with those reported
Figure 1. Video manipulation. (A) Real clip. (B) Fake action. (C) Doctored composite of (A) and (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032998.g001
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here, with large Critical Action Type x Session interaction effects
both for Belief ratings, F(2, 38) = 20.00, p,.001, g2p = .51, and
Memory ratings, F (2, 38) = 8.73, p= .001, g2p = .32.
Beliefs and memories, pre-debriefing
As a manipulation check, we were first interested to find
whether our doctored videos led participants to believe or
remember they performed the fake actions. To this end, we
examined participants’ action ratings from Session 2; these are
represented in the first column of data in Table 1. A one-way
repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant differences in
belief ratings across critical action types, F(2, 18) = 73.43, p,.001,
g2p = .89. Follow-up paired sample t-tests showed that performed
critical actions were rated significantly higher than both new
critical actions, t(19) = 10.76, p,.001, dz=2.41, and fake actions,
t(19) = 2.32, p= .03, dz=0.52. Importantly, fake actions were rated
significantly higher than new critical actions t(19) = 8.99, p,.001,
dz=2.01, which shows that our doctored videos had the intended
effect on beliefs. The same pattern of results held for memory
ratings: there were significant differences across critical action
types F(2, 18) = 62.50, p,.001, g2p = .87. Performed critical
actions were rated significantly higher than both new critical
actions, t(19) = 11.37, p,.001, dz=2.54, and fake actions,
t(19) = 3.37, p,.01, dz=0.75, but fake actions were rated
significantly higher than new critical actions, t(19) = 7.23,
p,.001, dz=1.62. Together these findings support those of Nash
et al. [9,10] and show that the doctored-video procedure was
effective at distorting participants’ beliefs and memories for their
actions.
We also assessed whether participants reported any nonbelieved
memories in this session. Recall that in Scoboria et al. [6],
participants gave memory ratings that were higher than their belief
ratings on just 4.3% of occasions. In Session 2 of the present study,
memory ratings were higher than belief ratings on 14.2% of
occasions (10% of performed critical actions; 15% of fake actions;
17.5% of new critical actions). This frequency of nonbelieved
memories is considerably higher than Scoboria et al.’s figure.
Random variations in participants’ ratings might account for
many of the nonbelieved memories when assessed in this way,
particularly because unlike Scoboria et al. we administered the
belief and memory questionnaires separately. For this reason we
also examined our data with more stringent criteria. First, we
classified responses as nonbelieved memories only if the memory
rating was at least 2 scale-points higher than belief rating. This
pattern held on 10.8% of occasions (7.5% of performed critical
actions; 12.5% of fake actions; 12.5% of new critical actions).
When the difference was required to be 3 or more scale-points, the
overall rate was 5.8% (5% performed, 5% fake, 7.5% new).
Beliefs and memories, post-debriefing
At the start of Session 3, we asked participants to guess what the
aim of the study was. Only one participant guessed a hypothesis
involving false memory or doctored videos; this participant was
removed from analysis and replaced with another participant.
We now turn to examining whether debriefing influenced
people’s beliefs and memories, and whether it created any
nonbelieved memories. To this end, we began by examining
participants’ belief and memory ratings from Session 3, after they
had been debriefed. These results are reported in the middle
column of data in Table 1. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA
on the belief ratings again revealed significant differences across
action types, F(2, 18) = 38.56, p,.001, g2p = .81. Performed
critical actions were rated higher than both new critical actions,
t(19) = 7.42, p,.001, dz=1.66, and fake actions, t(19) = 8.16,
p,.001, dz=1.83, but this time fake actions were no longer rated
higher than new critical actions in terms of belief, t(19) =20.42,
p= .68, dz=0.09. In other words, the debriefing appeared to undo
the effect of the doctored video-clips on participants’ beliefs.
Results were partly different for memory ratings. An ANOVA
revealed significant differences in memory ratings across critical
action types, F(2, 18) = 41.29, p,.001, g2p = .82. As before,
performed critical actions were rated higher than new critical
actions, t(19) = 9.30, p,.001, dz=2.08, and fake actions,
t(19) = 5.09, p,.001, dz=1.14, but unlike the pattern with the
belief ratings, memory ratings for fake actions remained
significantly higher than those for new critical actions,
t(19) = 2.70, p= .01, dz=0.60. That is to say, the debriefing did
not undermine participants’ memories of fake actions to the same
extent as it undermined their beliefs.
These analyses suggest that debriefing might have created some
additional nonbelieved memories. To assess whether this was the
case, as for Session 2 we examined participants’ Session 3 ratings
to see how often their memory ratings exceeded their belief ratings
by at least one scale-point: the criterion used in [1]. Overall, this
occurred for 26.7% of critical actions (20.0% of performed critical
actions; 42.5% of fake actions; 17.5% of new critical actions). As
compared to the Session 2 data, following debriefing there were
significantly more nonbelieved memories of fake actions, z=2.30,
p= .02. The same was not true of performed critical actions,
z=1.16, p= .25, or new critical actions, z=0.00, p=1.00. Indeed,
as Table 1 illustrates, after debriefing the mean memory ratings
were significantly greater than the belief ratings only for fake
actions, t(19) = 3.51, p,.01, dz=0.79; in all other conditions the
belief and memory ratings did not significantly differ (for all
contrasts, t,1.1, p..29, dz,.25).
When the more stringent criterion to measure nonbelieved
memories (memory minus belief $2 scale-points) was used, a
Table 1. Mean belief and memory ratings assigned to critical actions before and after debriefing.
Before debriefing After debriefing Change (After – Before)
M SD M SD M SD
Belief Performed actions 7.15 1.34 6.48 1.40 20.68 1.13
Fake actions 5.93 1.83 2.63 1.90 23.30 2.84
New actions 2.20 1.27 2.83 2.05 +0.63 1.78
Memory Performed actions 7.30 1.13 6.48 1.63 20.83 1.26
Fake actions 5.78 1.92 3.73 1.87 22.05 2.43
New actions 2.33 1.48 2.55 1.83 +0.23 1.96
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032998.t001
Non-Believed Memories for Recent Events
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32998
lower number of nonbelieved memories was obtained (14.2%
overall), but the decrease was mostly for performed (5%) and new
critical actions (7.5%). For fake actions memory ratings were at
least two points higher than belief ratings on 30% of occasions. A
similar pattern was found when the even more stringent criterion
of $3 scale-points was used, with 10.8% of nonbelieved memories
overall. Still 25% of the fake actions met this criterion, but only
5% of the performed critical actions and 2.5% of the new critical
actions. It is therefore clear that our false memory induction and
debriefing procedure substantially increased the incidence of
nonbelieved memories even when a highly stringent classification
criterion was used.
Change-scores
To explore our findings in more depth, we calculated change-
scores by subtracting participants’ belief and memory ratings given
at Session 2 from their ratings given at Session 3. These change-
scores are shown in the third column of data in Table 1, and
provide a measure of the effect of debriefing on beliefs and
memories. One-sample t-tests showed that with regard to
performed critical actions, the change-scores were significantly
below zero for both the belief, t(19) =22.93, p,.01, d=0.60, and
memory measures, t(19) =22.68, p= .02, d=0.66. These change-
scores for performed critical actions give us an indication of how
much deflation in ratings between Sessions 2 and 3 might plausibly
be attributed to simple weakening of memory-strength and
confidence across the time delay. Change-scores for fake actions
were also significantly below zero, (Belief, t(19) =25.19, p,.001,
d=1.16, Memory, t(19) =23.78, p= .001, d=0.84), but were also
significantly greater in magnitude than those for performed critical
actions (both ts.2.5, both ps,.05, both ds.0.56). These change-
scores therefore show that both beliefs and memories for fake
actions were undermined by debriefing, although the effect on
belief was significantly greater than the effect on memory. The
change-scores for new critical actions did not differ significantly
from zero (Belief, t(19) = 0.51, p= .61, d=0.11; Memory,
t(19) = 1.57, p= .13, d=0.35).
Phenomenological characteristics
The final element of our analysis was to look at the
characteristics of participants’ beliefs and memories. Recall that
at the end of Session 3, participants rated all six critical actions in
terms of 25 memory characteristics. For each of these 25
characteristics we computed a one-way ANOVA, with critical
action type as the repeated measures factor. After making a
Bonferroni correction (a= .05/25= .002), these analyses revealed
significant differences on 9 of the 25 memory characteristics,
including visual detail, feelings, and the experience of re-living.
However, follow-up t-tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed
that all of these effects were driven by memory characteristics for
performed critical actions being clearer than for fake and new
critical actions. In contrast, there were no significant differences
between the characteristics of memories for fake actions and new
critical actions.
To assess whether nonbelieved memories differ in characteris-
tics from other types of belief and memory phenomena, we
collapsed the Session 3 data across critical action types, and
categorised all 120 critical actions (6 actions620 participants) as
either a nonbelieved non-memory (n=76), believed non-memory
(n=5), nonbelieved memory (n=10), or believed memory (n=29).
Responses were classified as ‘beliefs’ whenever participants gave
belief ratings of 7 or 8, and also as ‘memories’ whenever they gave
memory ratings of 7 or 8. Thus instead of defining nonbelieved
memories as before in terms of the size of the difference between
memory and beliefs scores, here a nonbelieved memory is defined
specifically as a memory rated as 7 or 8, accompanied by a belief
rated 6 or below. We conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs to
compare the characteristics of different response-types; however,
we excluded believed non-memories from this analysis due to their
low frequency. As represented in Figure 2, our ANOVAs revealed
significant differences (a= .05/25= .002) on 18 of the 25 memory
characteristics. We were particularly interested in whether
nonbelieved memories differed from nonbelieved non-memories
(i.e., comparing nonbelieved events with vs. without an accompa-
nying memory), and from believed memories (i.e., comparing
memories with vs. without an accompanying belief). Follow-up t-
tests revealed that nonbelieved memories were rated as signifi-
cantly richer than nonbelieved non-memories on 12 of the 18
measures that had been significant overall; three of these were
significant at the Bonferroni-adjusted level (a=0.05/18=0.0028):
memory for location, t(17.88) = 3.76, p= .001, d=0.98, spatial
arrangement of people, t(19.82) = 4.36, p,.001, d=1.09, and
feeling of mental time-travel, t(84) = 3.75, p,.001, d=1.35. In
contrast, only two characteristics—clarity of thought and details of
thought (both ts,2.61, both ds,0.75)—differed between non-
believed memories and believed memories, and neither remained
significant after a Bonferroni-adjustment. These findings—along
with a visual inspection of Figure 2—broadly support those of
Mazzoni et al. [1], insofar as they show that nonbelieved memories
share many more similarities with believed memories than they do
with non-remembered events.
Discussion
Ours is the first study to our knowledge to systematically
examine whether the effects of a powerful false-memory induction
are ‘undone’ when participants are debriefed, or whether
nonbelieved memories are left behind. The data provide new
evidence—the first experimental evidence—for the proposal that
the occurrence of beliefs and memories can be independent.
Further building on the work of Mazzoni et al. [1] in which
participants described nonbelieved memories of childhood expe-
riences, the present study also represents the first empirical
demonstration of nonbelieved memories of recent experiences.
Confirming previous results [9], the manipulation used to
induce false memories was highly effective. Many false memories
for fake actions were obtained: 68% of memory ratings were above
the scale-midpoint, and a high percentage (58%) were in the high
confidence range (i.e., Memory $7). The debriefing manipulation
we used significantly increased participants’ tendency to rate their
memories for fake actions as stronger than their belief in those
actions, a response pattern that previous studies have shown to
occur only rarely [6]. This was true even with our most stringent
criterion: For 25% of fake actions, memory ratings were at least
three points above belief ratings, whereas this was true for just 4%
of other critical actions. Indeed, after debriefing, participants’
mean memory ratings for fake actions were significantly higher
than their mean belief ratings for those actions (and also higher
than their mean memory ratings for new critical actions). These
results suggest that after debriefing participants were left with some
residual memory-like content for the fake actions, that they did not
believe to be grounded in genuine experience.
The study of the dissociation between beliefs and memories
stems from research on the effects of suggestion, in which often the
creation of false beliefs has not been accompanied by false
memories [13]. This dissociation is important not only in false
memories (e.g., [14]), but also in episodic autobiographical
memory more generally [3,6], and for understanding some clinical
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conditions [5]. Previously, the distinction has been conceived as a
partial dissociation, in which memories are nested within belief
[6]. Here we have shown experimentally that the two are
theoretically independent, as the same manipulation affects
differently beliefs and memories. This leads to having believed
memories (what are usually called episodic memories); believed
but not remembered events; nonbelieved memories, and non-
believed and not remembered events. It is well established that
procedures that create false memories often increase beliefs more
easily than memories [13,15]. Similarly, this study shows that
procedures that aim at deleting false memories have a greater
effect on the belief than the memory. In other words, beliefs seem
to be in general more malleable than memories. We are unaware
of any theoretical reason to expect gender effects in terms of this
relative malleability; however, the low proportion of male
participants in the present study and the exclusively student
sample are limitations to the generalizability of these conclusions
that should be addressed in further studies.
Using the 262 classification system we explored the phenom-
enological characteristics of participants’ beliefs and memories, to
help understand what the word ‘memory’ might refer to. In the
current study believed and nonbelieved memories (combined
across all action types) did not differ on any measure that reflected
a recollective experience. This indicates that nonbelieved mem-
ories still maintain a strong sense of recollection (see also [1]), while
differing on non-recollective characteristics involving thoughts
(details of thought and clarity of thought). In contrast, several recollective
characteristics differed between nonbelieved memories and
nonbelieved non-memories; thus, memory, as opposed to belief,
could be conceived as recollection. We note, however, that one key
experience not assessed here is familiarity, which in some previous
studies has been shown to affect belief judgments [16,17], and in
other studies has been shown also to affect memory judgments
[18,19]. Future studies should independently manipulate in the
same procedure familiarity and recollection and assess how they
relate separately to belief.
One important question that remains unanswered by the
present study relates to the nature of the independence between
belief and memory. Is belief a necessary precursor to memory that
can nevertheless be removed afterwards, like scaffolding on a new
building? Or, alternatively, can memories form completely in the
absence of belief? One might reason that the former hypothesis
would be true: a memory-like image that develops in the absence
of belief would feasibly be attributed to a dream or to imagination.
Indeed, it might be that a belief itself can cause mental images to
be attributed to memory; belief could thus be conceptualised as a
form of source-monitoring cue in its own right, a conceptualisation
that fits with existing theoretical accounts of metacognitive
processes in autobiographical memory in which the strength of
the belief affects memorial processes. The idea that belief can
function as a monitoring cue in its own right also is in line with
other attributional models in which non-memorial information
(such as perceptual fluency) affects the ‘old/new’ decision in
recognition tasks [19,20]. Nevertheless, evidence against this
interpretation—and in favour of the latter hypothesis—is that
many of the nonbelieved memories in our study were not a
product of our suggestive doctored videos and debriefing:
participants occasionally reported nonbelieved memories for fake
actions in Session 2, as well as for performed and new actions in
Sessions 2 and 3. Thus here nonbelieved (sometimes false)
Figure 2. Phenomenological characteristics that differed between nonbelieved memories, believed memories and nonbelieved-
nonmemories.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032998.g002
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memories have occurred spontaneously and independently of the
experimental manipulation. These observations raise the intrigu-
ing possibility that memories might indeed sometimes form in the
absence of belief. This can occur only if beliefs and memories are
the product of different mechanisms.
Finally, our findings have broader implications for memory
distortion research. To the extent that debriefing might not always
completely ‘undo’ the effects of a suggestive manipulation, we
might question the ethics of inducing false memories in
experimental participants. Is it ethical for participants to leave
research labs with remnants of nonbelieved false memory content
in the forefront of their minds? A sensible approach to answering
this question might be to consider whether the memories would
likely be consequential. For example, it is conceivable that a
person who ceased believing in a traumatic experience might
nevertheless continue to be traumatised by intrusive mental images
experienced as memories. We suggest that for most false-memory
paradigms and study designs, this is highly unlikely to pose an
ethical problem. Nevertheless, how participants might feel about
any residual memory content should be an important question for
researchers to consider when planning studies.
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